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The influence of money on politics poses an acute problem for 
American democracy. That is hardly surprising since the United 
States is among the most durably democratic and fiercely capitalis-
tic of nations. The tension between these two systems--economic 
and political-reaches its apex in the electoral context. Tremen-
dous financial resources are indispensable to the mass media cam-
paigns that characterize contemporary national politics. Yet, as 
Senator Barry Goldwater has written, "unlimited campaign spend-
ing eats at the heart" of the process of self-government. 
The dangers of unregulated electoral financing are multifaceted 
and well known. Campaigns in which one side greatly outspends 
the other have few elements of a fair fight. Monetary resources 
have a direct impact on the candidates' ability to communicate with 
the electorate. Politicians believe, with apparent cause, that expen-
sive advertising campaigns pay off at the polls. Faced with such 
expenditures, some citizens see politics as the arena of the rich. 
Wealth also presents the potential for corruption. The ever increas-
ing cost of campaigns renders elected officials too dependent on fi-
nancial supporters. Even if candidates resist the temptations of 
high finance, the appearance of wrongdoing remains. 
Unbridled political expenditures threaten more than the fair-
ness of our elections and the perceived virtue of our leaders. Citi-
zens whose wealth allows them to complement their enthusiasm for 
a candidate or an issue with a substantial financial contribution en-
joy a special "equality" of electoral participation. Their speech is 
amplified by the mass media in a way that less affluent participants 
will be unlikely to match. They also obtain easier access to the of-
ficeholder. Their ideas and interests are apt to be given a fuller, and 
perhaps understandably, a more sympathetic hearing. 
This does not mean, of course, that levels of campaign finance 
are always at odds with democratic sentiment. A political candi-
date's ability to raise money may well be a function of the popular-
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ity of her ideas. Nor is it true that money is everything in a political 
campaign. Occasionally, the more extravagant candidate loses. 
Frugal supporters may work longer hours, be more persuasive as 
they proceed from door to door, know more about grass roots or-
ganizing, or possess skills not employed by better financed adversa-
ries. Still, the reality of modern electoral campaigning leaves them 
at a disadvantage. Money remains the mother's milk of politics and 
contributors enjoy a unique status in electoral participation. One 
person, one vote hardly captures the essence of modern politics. 
Recognizing the potentially corrosive impact of excessive 
spending, Congress has, through a variety of statutory provisions, 
sought to regulate federal campaign funding. The Federal Election 
Campaign Act amendments limit the size of political contributions 
and the amounts which may be spent "relative to a clearly defined 
candidate." The Act requires groups who spend or receive cam-
paign funds to disclose the names of contributors, and the amount 
of the contributors, good will. For presidential elections, the statute 
also initiated a system of public funding to forestall the need for 
large contributions. 
But campaign spending regulations implicate core first amend-
ment values. As a result, campaign finance reforms have received a 
mixed reception in the courts. The landmark decision in Buckley v. 
Valeo ratified parts of the congressional scheme and invalidated 
others. For example, public funding and disclosure requirements 
were upheld. Financial limitations, however, sustained a split ver-
dict. More specifically, the Court held that individual contributions 
to campaign committees may be limited and that across the board 
campaign spending caps are permissible as part of a public funding 
scheme. At the same time, ceilings on the total expenditures by a 
candidate were said to violate the first amendment. Perhaps most 
importantly, limits on independent expenditures on a candidate's 
behalf by individuals or groups were held unconstitutional. 1 
Over the next decade, the Supreme Court employed the Buck-
ley approach to a variety of state and federal electoral regulations, 
with mixed consequences. The result at the national level, as Jus-
tice White has argued, is that an apparently "coherent regulatory 
scheme" has been transformed into a "nonsensical, loophole ridden 
patchwork. "2 The distinction between political contributions and 
independent expenditures, which forms the core of the campaign 
finance cases, has proven both unpersuasive and anomalous. The 
I. 424 U.S. I (1976) (per curiam). 
2. F.E.C. v. National Conservative Political Action Commitee, 105 S. Ct. 1459, 1479 
(1985) (White, J .. dissenting). 
1989] CAMPAIGN FINANCE 321 
Court's attempt to treat contributions as mere demonstrations of 
solidarity shortchanges the expressive interests entailed in political 
benefaction.J Moreover, Buckley allows Congress to prohibit a 
$50,000 offering to a candidate to help defer the costs of a television 
campaign, but not direct payment by a donor to the station to keep 
the ads running. The drafters of the FECA were correct in thinking 
that this "wooden" interpretation of the Constitution renders the 
Act "virtually meaningless." If the unequal political access that 
wealth can buy is a "critical problem for contemporary first amend-
ment theory," Buckley doesn't seem to be the solution.4 
It is not my purpose here, however, to explore generally the 
constitutional validity of campaign finance regulations. I shall ex-
amine instead a single central premise of Buckley and its progeny. 
Various components of the Federal Election Campaign Act are 
designed, at least in part, to "equalize the relative ability of individ-
uals and groups to influence the outcome of elections." Since the 
Supreme Court's decisions have closely equated political spending 
with speech, however, the expenditure equalization rationale of the 
FECA has been regarded as suspect. In Buckley, the Court ruled 
that "the concept that government may restrict the speech of some 
elements of society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is 
wholly foreign to the First Amendment."s First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti 6 used the same premise to invalidate a Massachu-
setts statute prohibiting certain corporate political expenditures. 
And more recent Supreme Court efforts have held that Congress 
may not use its regulatory powers to attempt to equalize the effects 
of campaign spending. Scholars have echoed the claim, arguing 
that the "enhancement theory ... has no place in any sensible treat-
ment of the First Amendment. "7 
The Court's rejection of the equality justification for regulating 
3. People donate money to campaigns to support ideas as well as candidates. They 
recognize that their views are apt to get the widest play out of the mouths of candidates. See, 
Polsby, Buckley v. Valeo-The Special.Vature of Political Speech, 1976 Sur. CT. REV. I, 23. 
I think, for example, that providing financial support for Ronald Reagan's 1980 presidential 
campaign was a decidedly effective method of furthering conservative political values. This, 
of course, does amount to hiring someone to speak for you. But surely "hired" speech is 
constitutionally protected. And one would guess that the great bulk of candidate-identified 
independent expenditures which the FECA sought unsuccessfully to regulate are purchased 
professional efforts as well. See. Powe, Jfass Speech and the Sewer First Amendment, 1982 
St.:P. CT. REv. 243, 258-59. Moreover. the Supreme Court has been unable to maintain the 
"speech by someone other than the contributor" rationale . .\"CPAC. 105 S. Ct. at 1461. 
4. See, Carter, Technology. Democracy and the .11anipulation of Consent (Book Re-
view), 93 YALE L.J. 581 (1984). See also S. REP. No. 93-689. reprinted in 1974 U.S. CONG. 
CODE & ADMIN. NEWS 5604-05. 
5. 424 U.S. at 48-49. 
6. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
7. Powe, cl1ass Speech and the .\'ewer First Amendment. 1982 St.:P. Cr. REV. 243, 246; 
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campaign finance will be the focus of this essay. I believe that re-
stricting the amount of money some can spend "in order to enhance 
the relative voice of others" is far from "foreign" to our system of 
free expression. It may well become an essential component of the 
first amendment's development. That does not mean, of course, 
that all, or even any, efforts to further equal political participation 
through regulation are constitutionally permissible. Equality is but 
one of several values implicated by limitations on campaign finance. 
Moreover, restrictions on the amount of money which may be spent 
on political expression present such intractable problems of applica-
tion and demarcation-both theoretical and practical-that their 
constitutional status can hardly be assessed with confidence. 
The Court's hasty rejection of the equality rationale may sug-
gest, however, that the campaign spending decisions have unneces-
sarily hindered electoral reform. Whether or not that ultimately 
proves to be the case, Buckley and its progeny have clearly managed 
to sidestep the constitutional dilemma presented by the regulation 
of campaign spending. As long as the impact of money on the polit-
ical process remains problematic, the tensions that Buckley avoided 
still lie ahead. Perhaps the first amendment's free speech guarantee 
should be interpreted in its third century to address the frictions 
between our political and our economic traditions more directly. 
I 
Restrictions on campaign contributions and expenditures obvi-
ously limit political expression. Buckley measured these restraints 
against three asserted government interests: preventing real or per-
ceived corruption, slowing down the rising cost of campaigns, and 
equalizing individual influence over the outcome of elections by 
muting "the voices of affluent persons and groups. " 8 The rejection 
of the third rationale--equalization-as a legitimate governmental 
concern led to the result in Buckley. Under Buckley, campaign con-
tributions were held to be clearly related to the corrupting dangers 
of a political quid pro quo. Expenditures advocating the election or 
defeat of a candidate "made independently of the ... campaign," 
however, apparently neither directly increase the cost of running for 
office, nor "pose dangers of ... corruption comparable to ... [those 
resulting from] campaign contributions. " 9 Accordingly, the case 
for sustaining the contribution limits while invalidating the expendi-
and BeVier, .'vfoney and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Re-
form. 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045 (1985). 
8. 424 U.S. at 25-26. 
9. /d. at 46. 
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ture caps seemed to flow from the first amendment with ease. 10 
The legislative history of the FECA reveals, however, that the 
"chief goal of the contribution and expenditure limitations [was] to 
provide the federal election process with a greater measure of equal 
political opportunity."tt By gutting vital portions of the regulatory 
program, the Court's treatment of spending limits and the equality 
rationale deprived the Act of its central aim. In the process, the 
debate over the constitutional boundaries of electoral reform shifted 
to a series of relatively technical distinctions. Few areas of constitu-
tional jurisprudence, for example, have engendered so much debate 
over the appropriate standard of review as have the campaign fi-
nance cases. Entire articles have been written analyzing whether 
the Buckley Court correctly applied "strict scrutiny." Surprisingly, 
the advocates of judicial deference count among their numbers 
Professors Tribe, Cox and Judge Wright-not otherwise known for 
counselling timid visions of the first amendment. To my mind, this 
strange alignment is not unrelated to the rejection of the equality 
rationale. If equalizing the relative ability of individuals to influ-
ence the outcome of elections with their financial resources had 
been recognized as a permissible, and sometimes overwhelming, 
goal of government, some spending limitations might survive ele-
vated review. It would no longer be necessary to attempt to charac-
terize spending limits as essentially untroubling. After all, a law 
that makes it a crime for a person to place a "single, one-quarter 
page advertisement ... in a major metropolitan newspaper" is noth-
ing to sneeze at.J2 
The equally energetic debate over whether money is speech can 
be seen in a similar light. The Court's complete rejection of the 
equality rationale inappropriately disregards Congress's concern 
about the linkage of financial and political resources. But the finan-
cial regulations are also not simply limitations on spending money. 
They limit the spending of money to engage in a particular activity, 
and that activity is constitutionally protected. The impact on polit-
ical expression is intentional, significant and direct. Imagine Judge 
Wright's response to a statute that restricted the amount of money a 
woman can spend to obtain an abortion to $200 per year, or that 
10. 424 U.S at 25-26,28-29 and 46-47. In result, of course. the Buckley majority turned 
aside only part of the congressional effort to promote equality. The public funding scheme 
for presidential elections was sustained as an acceptable tool "to reduce the deleterious influ-
ence of large contributions on our political process ... !d. at 91. The federal election cases 
indicate, therefore, that in the campaign finance context Congress can use the carrot to foster 
political opportunity, but not the stick. 
II. !d. at 40. SeeS. REP. No. 92-96, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). 
12. Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to 
Political Equality0 , 82 CoLVM. L. RES. 609-11 (1982). 
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limited the amount of money an individual can give to a church to 
$20 a week. The exacting question presented by the campaign fi-
nance regulations of the FECA is not whether those restrictions 
burden constitutionally protected speech. They clearly, even dra-
matically, do so. The question lying at the heart of Buckley, rather, 
is whether speech may be so burdened in order to enhance the rela-
tive voice of other speakers. The refusal of the Supreme Court to 
address that issue seriously has bestowed questions like the stan-
dard of review and the link between money and speech with greater 
significance than they deserve. 
II 
The campaign finance decisions draw a "tight equation" be-
tween the expenditure of money and constitutionally protected 
speech. That conclusion, without more, is unsurprising. Political 
communication in today's mass society costs money. "Increasing 
dependence on television [and] radio," in the Court's view, "has 
made these expensive modes of communication indispensable in-
struments of effective political speech." t3 This nexus, of course, 
provides the basis for the Court's demanding review of campaign 
finance limitations. And since the equalization premise of the 
FECA has been deemed invalid, (at least with regard to limits on 
independent expenditures), strict scrutiny has proven fatal.t4 
It is difficult to quarrel with this logic-as far as it goes. But 
the direct linkage of money and speech is a double-edged sword. 
Buckley and its progeny purport to be rooted in the real world of 
American political life. If you can't spend money, the theory goes, 
you can't meaningfully speak. Yet if we think of the millions of 
Americans who, under the Court's premise, simply cannot afford to 
"speak," the equalization rationale begins to take on a different cast. 
Consider Dean Stone's defense of the Buckley Court's strict re-
view of expenditure limits. Stone persuasively argues that "an indi-
vidual willing to spend $10,000, but limited by law to $1,000, has no 
ready alternative to make up for the $9,000 reduction in the total 
amount of his expression. It simply won't do to tell that individual 
to distribute leaflets instead."ts No indeed. Cheap speech is no 
substitute for mass communication. But it is hardly appropriate to 
examine only one side of that coin. If a $1,000 expenditure limit 
13. 424 U.S. at 19. 
14. Polsby, Buckley v. Valeo--The Special !Vature of Political Speech, 1976 Sur. CT. 
REV. I, 18. 424 U.S. at 20. 
15. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 59-60(1987). See, Wil· 
Iiams, The Idea of Equality, in JusTICE AND EQUALITY 116, 128-29 (H. Bedau ed. 1971). 
1989] CAMPAIGN FINANCE 325 
threatens to render a potential $10,000 speaker ninety per cent cen-
sored, what is the status of a citizen who would like to engage in 
mass speech but has no money? Is it clear that Congress must dis-
regard the plight of the bulk of the American populace in its electo-
ral expression calculus? 
Tensions between our economic and political frameworks 
come to the fore at this point. If the non-affluent are unable to en-
gage in effective political expression, our economic traditions, but-
tressed by the state action doctrine and our custom of negative 
rights, teach that government is not the source of inequality. Our 
political aspirations, however, lead in a different direction. Some of 
the cornerstones of constitutional jurisprudence assert in uncom-
promising tones that "wealth ... is not germane to one's ability to 
participate intelligently in the electoral process," and that "each 
and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective partic-
ipation in ... politic[s]. ... "16 Those statements are difficult to 
square with the Court's twin conclusions that on the one hand it is 
impossible to speak without money, and on the other that it is im-
permissible to "restrict the speech of some elements of our society 
in order to enhance the relative voice of others." 17 
One possible escape from the dilemma is to use the carrot 
rather than the stick. Buckley sustained the implementation of 
campaign spending ceilings in publicly funded presidential elec-
tions. "Public financing" was characterized as an acceptable means 
of "eliminating the improper influence of large private contribu-
tions .... "1s Funding formulas, however, present their own ine-
quality problems; and it is unrealistic to suppose that government 
subsidization of elections will be implemented across the board. It 
is one thing for the federal government to foot the bill in presiden-
tial elections. It is even possible that the Congress wiii pass legisla-
tion to publicly fund House and Senate races. Local governments, 
however, can hardly be expected to follow the federal lead. Nor is it 
clear that public funding is a viable option in referendum cam-
paigns. But most important, as long as enthusiastic and generous 
supporters are left free to "supplement" publicly funded campaigns 
by the unrestricted use of independent expenditures, the right to 
political participation is threatened by economic inequality. Unless 
funding schemes are accompanied by meaningful spending limita-
tions, the schemes won't work. If expenditure limits are used, how-
16. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections. 383 U.S. 663. 668 (1966). See also Hill v. 
Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533. 565 (1964). 
17. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49. 
18. !d. at 96. 
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ever, the asserted tension between freedom of expression and the 
equality rationale remains. 19 
In part the difficulty arises because the Court's characteriza-
tion of the equality rationale is too sweeping. The campaign finance 
cases describe the FECA's concern with economic disparity as the 
desire to "equalize the relative ability of individuals and groups to 
influence the outcome of elections."2o But contribution and expen-
diture limitations do not literally try to equalize everyone's chances 
of influencing electoral campaigns. Hundreds of the factors which 
citizens, organizations, and candidates bring to bear on the election 
process are left unmolested. Differences in persuasive ability, ap-
pearance, charisma, name recognition, organizational skill, commu-
nity ties, and other often determinative concerns remain free to 
affect elections. Nor, as has sometimes been claimed, does the regu-
lation of campaign financing posit an "ideal" deliberative selection 
procedure and then attempt to force our democracy into the 
imagined mold. The FECA does not prohibit candidates from run-
ning campaigns dominated by content-free, thirty-second advertise-
ments that threaten to leave American political life devoid of both 
issues and intelligence.2I 
Campaign finance measures turn on simpler premises. They 
arise from the recognition, echoed by the Supreme Court in Buck-
ley, that financial distinctions dramatically affect citizens' opportu-
nities to participate in the political process. This empirical 
conclusion is then measured against the democratic ideal, reflected 
in cases like Harper v. Virginia Board of Electors, that wealth is not 
"germane" to political participation. Responding to this clear ten-
sion, contribution and expenditure limitations are designed to miti-
gate the harm to equal political opportunity which results from 
financial disparity. Efforts to curb the influence of wealth on poli-
tics present inherent conflicts with free speech only if we assume 
that the first amendment enacts a system of expression reserved for 
those who can compete with dollars in a free market. That premise, 
however, is not demanded by the text, nor is it consistent with judi-
cial acceptance of public funding schemes. As Professor Van Al-
styne has written in another context, this premise is also based on a 
"fatal myopia in its failure to see how clearly freedom of speech is 
abridged by a government policy that adheres only to a private 
property system and a market pricing mechanism in determining 
19. 424 U.S. at 97-100. See also 424 U.S. at 293 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). S.2, Sena-
torial Election Campaign Fund Act of 1987, tOOth Cong., Report No. 100-58. 
20. 424 U.S. at 48. 
21. BeVier, supra note 7, at 1067. 
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who shall be able to speak. "22 
Nor is the notion of separating economic power from political 
participation "wholly foreign" to our system of governance. Limi-
tations on the use of corporate and union funds to support political 
candidates have traditionally been rooted in just such a premise. 
Consider the Supreme Court's decision in Federal Election Commis-
sion v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life.2J There the Justices ruled 
that federal regulations which prohibit the use of corporate treasury 
funds to make independent electoral expenditures cannot be consti-
tutionally applied to certain advocacy groups using the corporate 
form. General corporate restrictions were thought permissible, 
however, since "direct corporate spending on political activity 
raises the prospect that resources amassed in the economic market-
place may be used to provide an unfair advantage in the political 
marketplace. "24 Massachusetts Citizens for Life explicitly "ac-
knowledge[s] the legitimacy of Congress' concern that organiza-
tions" which amass wealth in the economic sphere not be allowed to 
exercise undue political power as a result.zs But if wealth is not 
"germane" to participation in politics, what goes for organizations 
should go for individuals as well.26 
There is a sense, however, in which the expenditure limitations 
set forth in the FECA take the goal of political equality a step be-
yond decisions like Harper and Reynolds v. Sims. Those rulings 
sought to remove impediments to equality constructed by the 
state-a poll tax in one instance and a malapportioned legislature in 
the other. Campaign reform measures seek to mitigate the harm 
flowing from disparities created by the operation of a "private" 
market. Relying on an equality standard rather than existing pat-
terns of wealth to determine individual opportunity is hardly the 
norm in our society. Moreover, the traditional vision of the first 
amendment demands complete governmental neutrality, or inac-
tion, in the face of political expression. 
Of course the lines between action and inaction, neutrality and 
22. Van Alstyne, The Mobius Strip of the First Amendment: Perspectives on Red Lion, 
29 S.C.L. REV. 539, 562 ( 1978) (rebutting claim that free market pricing should determine 
licensing issues in electronic media context). See also Baker, Scope of the First Amendment 
Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 964, 981-90 (1978). 
23. 479 U.S. 238 (1986). 
24. /d. at 247. 
25. /d. at 263. 
26. In United States v. Automobile Workers. 352 U.S. 567 (1957), for example, the 
Supreme Court upheld a statutory prohibition on the use of union funds in elections for 
federal office. The prohibition was described as essential to "curb the political influence of 
those who exercise control over large aggregations of capital. .. /d. at 585. See also Federal 
Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 107 S. Ct. 616, 628-31 (1986). 
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intervention, have become increasingly difficult to manage in all of 
constitutional law. And the inaction which Buckley and its sup-
porters demand is of a particular variety. Cass Sunstein has written 
that "both neutrality and inaction [are] defined by reference to the 
behavior of private actors ... in light of the existing distribution of 
wealth and entitlements."27 Neutrality, therefore, perpetuates the 
existing order and escapes constitutional sanction. Government 
conduct which proposes change, on the other hand, represents "ac-
tion" and is subject to review. This apparent constitutional pre-
sumption favoring the preservation of the status quo may render the 
public-private distinction problematic.2s 
Wherever one comes out on that debate, however, campaign 
finance reform presents a particularly unappealing case for the ap-
plication of a rigid government neutrality requirement. As the race 
decisions have demonstrated, persistent state inaction in the face of 
pervasive private deprivation blurs the distinction between in-
flicting, and merely failing to prevent, harm. An electoral scheme 
that strongly tracks existing patterns of wealth knowingly accepts a 
significant denial of political equality. A reasonable argument 
could be made, therefore, that a congressional regulatory regime ig-
noring the disparities in political power resulting from economic ad-
vantage imposes considerable harm to the egalitarian ideal. Given 
the difficulty of separating cause from failure to prevent harm under 
any neutrality theory, the Court has little justification in overturn-
ing Congress' choice, through the FECA, to ameliorate existing ec-
onomically-based, political inequalities.29 
What the Court in Buckley characterized as the "equality" ra-
tionale is, in fact, an attempt by Congress to segregate political from 
financial power. It aims to protect the equality the Constitution 
demands in the former realm, from the massive inequalities that 
characterize the latter. So understood, the governmental interest 
undergirding both contribution and expenditure limitations is not 
only an acceptable, but often a compelling public concern. 
Of course, an embrace of the equality rationale does not lead 
inexorably to the conclusion that all independent expenditure limits 
or overall campaign spending ceilings are constitutional. Such re-
strictions raise many questions. Expenditure limits often restrict 
27. Sunstein. Lochner's Legacy. 87 CoL L. REV. 873, 917-19 (1987). 
28. See generally, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1147-1175 (1978). See 
also Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. L. REV. 503 (1985): and J. Shklar, Injus-
tice. Injury and Inequality in JUSTICE AND EQUALITY: HERE AND Now 21 (1987). 
29. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulley, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. I 
(1948); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1962); and L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHOICES 246-47 (1985). 
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speech in more pervasive ways than do contribution limits. Like 
contribution caps, they may operate in a particularly burdensome 
way on unpopular groups. Expenditure limits, if low enough, may 
work to reduce expression far more than any hoped for equality 
gain can justify. It is even possible that the problems of scope and 
application engendered by meaningful restrictions wiii prove to be 
so formidable that the effort should be rejected. 
More fundamentally, restraining the quantity of money which 
can be dedicated to campaign expression runs counter to the normal 
"more speech" premises of the first amendment. And if govern-
ment can attempt to minimize the impact of money on the electoral 
process, why not other "irrelevant" factors like name recognition or 
good looks? If limiting the money that can be spent on political 
speech is acceptable, why not "equalize" the money spent on other 
types of expression? Can the McDonald's advertising budget be 
checked in order to afford equal economic opportunity to a mom 
and pop diner? 
There may be no satisfactory answers to these sorts of ques-
tions. The reasons to confront them directly, however, and to treat 
the impact of financial power on the political process as an arena of 
special constitutional concern, are far more clear. John Rawls has 
written that "the effects of injustices in the political system are 
much more grave and long-lasting than market imperfections."Jo 
As those with greater private means are permitted to use their ad-
vantage to control the course of public debate, political power ac-
cumulates and the coercive apparatus of the state can be employed 
to ensure favored position. Symbolically, the impact of financial 
power on the political process is destructive as well. If the less fa-
vored are effectively prevented from exercising their fair degree of 
influence, apathy and resentment are likely to result. A constitu-
tionally mandated laissez-faire system of electoral expression can 
thus generate pronounced harm to political equality.JI 
Limitations on campaign financing present a clash between lib-
erty and equality interests-both of which have constitutional pedi-
grees.32 Buckley, by rejecting the equality rationale, sidestepped the 
30. J. RAWLS. A THEORY OF JUSTICE 226 (1971 ). 
31. See M. WALZER, Jt.:STICE .-\ND EQt.:ALITY 144 (1986): and Tushnet, Corporations 
and Free Speech in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQL'E 253 (Kairys ed. 
1981). 
32. The relationship between equalily and the first amendment in this context has re-
ceived ample attention. Professor Karst has written that equality is a "central principle" of 
the first amendment. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle of the First Amendment, 43 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 20 (1975). Others have claimed that the "goals furthered by the principles of 
equality are. both conceptually and practically, distinct from the purposes of freedom of ex-
pression." Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 
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constitutional dilemma posed by the FECA. There is perhaps a 
strong temptation, when faced with the spectacle of competing con-
stitutional values tugging in opposite directions, to abandon com-
pletely the weaker, less traditional claim. The constitutional 
landscape is made to appear less sullied and less complex. But ne-
glected demands often reappear, seeking a fuller hearing. And it is 
simply not known how far these conflicting claims can be recon-
ciled. The influence of money on politics remains an intractable 
problem for this democracy. The "thorniest" issues of electoral re-
form are not rendered less so by being ignored.33 
113, 136 (1981). See also Van Alstyne, supra note 17, at 572; Blasi, Prior Restraints on Dem-
onstrations, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1482 (1970). 
Campaign finance reforms. no doubt, implicate both liberty and equality concern_s. 
Whether the equality interests are appropriately lodged in the first amendment Itself, or m 
Congress' "substantive authority to regulate federal elections" (Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I 
(1976)) is not crucial-though the former route presents some mterestmg hngmst1c difficul-
ties. In either event, there is "some foothold for the notion of equality in these cases." B. 
WILLIAMS, Jt:STICE A~D EQUALITY 126-7 (H. Bedau ed. 1971). See also F. SCHAUER, 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 212 n.l4 (1982): "The Free Speech 
principle ... necessarily implies some degree of equality among speakers." 
33. Karst, supra note 18, at 64. 
